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INTENTIONALLY SUFFERING?
In “Two Senses of See”, Marie McGinn presents two tag-teams of philosophers: in the one 
corner, Austin and me; in the other Anscombe and Wittgenstein. I am sceptical as to those 
lineups. !ere is, for one thing, an initial unclarity as to the contest. Sometimes it is to be over 
whether the verb ‘see’ is intentional, or has an intentional sense—or use. Sometimes it is over 
whether perception, or verbs of perception, is/are intentional, or (Anscombe) “have an 
intentional aspect” (1965/1981: 11). when it comes to Wittgenstein, the interesting issues she 
discusses in fact lie elsewhere altogether. About these she has an interesting suggestion, 
though, I will suggest, right or wrong, no threat to Austin or to me, and no comfort to 
Anscombe.
Questions about the verb ‘see’ and about perception are liable to part company at this 
point: like many words whose original home is, no doubt, perceptual (‘looks’, ‘idea’, for a 
start), ‘see’ has uses other than to speak of experiencing perceptually—as in, ‘I see that you 
plan to make heavy weather of this.’ So the verb ‘see’ could be intentional on some uses 
without that touching on the idea of intentional experience at all. As to this last, an initial 
remark is: while an experience (so a perceptual one) may be one of witnessing such-and-such 
(so enjoying awareness of something), it is also, in any case, something one undergoes—
something in"icted on, su#ered by, one. And it is unclear what it would mean to su#er 
something intentionally. !ough nor, of course, need it be clear at the outset just what 
intentionality is meant to be.
As to the tag teams, I am not sure just what Anscombe meant to argue in her justly 
famous essay. Its title, though, speaks of the intentionality of ‘sensation’, which, though 
perception is not sensation, suggests that it is perception she means to discuss, or at least uses 
of ‘see’ as a verb of perceptual experience. I think that, in any case, she has made no case for 
thinking this intentional. I will discuss that point last. But if she is up to something on those 
lines then, indeed, she stands on the other side of one divide which $nds Austin and me on its 
other side. As for Wittgenstein, at least in those late manuscripts McGinn discusses, he is 
interested (for reasons some of which I will, somewhat speculatively, suggest) in some very 
special phenomena which either are perceptual, or are di%cult to classify as perceptual or not. 
McGinn suggests something Wittgenstein may well want to say about some of these 
phenomena. But in this arena his concerns are not with intentionality, and (I will suggest) he 
does nothing to suggest that anything like a perceptual experience is intentional. !e issues 
Anscombe raises are largely orthogonal to his concerns. So far as I can see, neither Austin nor 
I line up against Wittgenstein. So I am afraid McGinn’s programme has him on the wrong tag 
team.
1. Perception and !e Verb ‘See’: McGinn cites Anscombe as saying that “verbs of sense 
perception … are intentional or essentially have an intentional aspect.” If we like, we can 
stipulate that the verbs ‘see’, ‘hear’, ‘smell’, etc., are to be called verbs of sense perception. 
Perhaps they also have ‘intentional uses’, though it is not at all clear to me that they do. But, as 
Frege noted (1897: 149, 1918: 61), ‘see’ has non-perceptual uses. When we say, for example, 
‘He sees that that "ower has $ve petals’ (one of Frege’s examples), ‘see’ is not used to report 
perceptual awareness. One way to see this is to note that, while the petals are on the "ower in 
the garden, and from thence form images on retinas—they are that sort of thing—that the 
"ower has $ve petals is not in the garden. Nor is it on the kitchen table. It is not the sort of 
thing to be located, a fortiori, to form images on retinas. Rather, it is the sort of thing one 
recognises by exercising capacities of thought. In thought, one can represent the "ower as 
falling under a certain generality; as being a certain way there is for a "ower to be—$ve-
petalled.
It seems almost inevitable that any perceptual verb (and some other parts of speech) will 
pick up, naturally, non-perceptual uses. !ough verbs having to do with sight are particularly 
apt for this. It would be interesting to pursue the question why this is. Not only is there ‘see 
that’, but there are also such constructions with ‘looks’ as ‘looks to be’, as in (on the latest 
vandalisms by the minister of education) ‘!is looks to be the end of an era.’ (How does the 
end of an era look? Bad question.) Indeed, it seems that the word ‘idea’ originally had a 
perceptual use, now, I think, entirely lost (outside of philosophy).
Frege’s discussion of the construction ‘see that’ was meant to draw our attention to two 
di#erent sorts of awareness, invoking two di#erent sorts of capacity. !ere is perceptual (e.g., 
visual) awareness. In the $rst instance, at least, this is something one enjoys in perception 
proper: the sort of awareness I enjoy of the wine in my glass by seeing it, or, again, tasting it. 
!en there is what one might call cognitive awareness—realising that my companion’s glass is 
empty, for example. I think Wittgenstein was interested in the possibility of cases where such 
a distinction is not to be drawn, or at least not straightforwardly. Such would be, for him, 
exceptional cases. But Wittgenstein is yet to come.
One might further note that non-perceptual uses of ‘see’ show up in other constructions 
besides ‘see that’. !ere is also at least ‘see as’. Perhaps this sometimes has perceptual uses. (I 
think it does.) But it also has uses like this: ‘I see social networking as a threat to civilisation’, 
or ‘I see wind energy as our hope for the future.’ To repeat, there need not always be an 
answer to the question whether some given use is perceptual or cognitive; whether it speaks 
of perceiving or thinking. Usually, though, there is an answer. And it is worth keeping in 
mind that there are the two sorts of case.
To return, then, to Anscombe. !ere are, at least, these di#erent theses: the verb ‘see’ is 
intentional; perception is intentional, or has an intentional object. !e verb ‘see’ might be 
intentional (if there is such a thing as intentionality) because it has uses on which it does not 
speak of perception (nor of perceptual experience, if such has a wider scope than perception 
proper), and on these uses it is intentional. (I do not assert that this is so.) Whether 
perception is intentional depends on what it is that it is possible to see, using ‘see’ here as a 
verb of perception. It is to this question that I thought, and continue to think, the answer is 
‘No’. I am not perfectly clear as to what McGinn thinks the answer to this question is. But 
more on that later. I take it, though I might misunderstand, that Anscombe takes the answer 
to be ‘Yes’. I do not think Witttgenstein o#ers any such answer.
‘See’, used to report a case of perceiving, is not an intentional verb, for one thing, 
because it is a success verb. You cannot see the (or even a) toad on the lotus leaf if there is no 
toad. If you do see the toad, and it is the one Princess Elisabeth kissed, then you ipso facto see 
the toad Princess Elisabeth kissed. !e construction ‘see that’, I think, follows the pattern of 
‘know that’. You cannot see that the toad is on the leaf unless the toad is on the leaf (and hence 
a toad is. Perhaps, though, one can see that that toad is on the leaf without seeing that the 
toad that kissed Princess Elisabeth is on the leaf. Or, more exactly, there are occasions on 
which one can speak truth in the $rst way without entailing what one would then say to be so 
in speaking in the second way.
As for ‘see as’, on its non-perceptual uses, I can certainly see something as something it 
is not—e.g., a threat. I cannot see nothing as anything. I cannot, e.g., see ‘Virgil the snark’ as a 
threat. As for perceptual uses of ‘see as’, it is unclear to me that one can see something as 
something it is not, though I do not want to $ght the point. I am sure that one cannot see 
nothing as anything. What might a case of seeing something as something it is not be like? 
Perhaps like seeing a fork as a bracelet? But this just means seeing it as what could be made 
into, or used as, a bracelet. Or perhaps like seeing a "y close to your eye as a bird outside the 
window (being fooled by distances)? But here it seems to me that ‘I saw the "y as a bird’ is not 
the most natural description of what happened. !e "y looked like a bird to me. Or it 
appeared to me as a (great) bird. Here, though, I feel disinclined to $ght hard. As for ‘see’ 
neat, e.g., as in seeing the coconut, seeing the coconut fall, seeing the pig, seeing it snu&ing, 
again, I do not think there is any understanding of ‘see’ on which you can see things that are 
not there, or never happened (‘see’ in perfect order without scare-quotes). Nor do I think 
Wittgenstein thinks there are. Anscombe suggests otherwise. I will consider some of her 
examples at the end.
2. Wittgenstein and Aspects: What follows will be somewhat speculative. Moreover, the 
construals I will give of various cases Wittgenstein discusses are mine, and not necessarily his.
Wittgenstein discussed seeing-as in the Tractatus. However he then stood towards what 
he said, he certainly would not have said the same from 1946 on, at least in propria persona. 
Speculation: perhaps one goal of those late manuscripts was to try to work out what one 
should say here (a goal not fully attained). In any event, what he said in the Tractatus is this:
To perceive a complex is to perceive that its constituents are combined 
in such-and-such way.
!is perhaps explains that the $gure [the Necker] can be seen in 
two ways as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two 
di#erent facts. (5.5423)
But surely not. Seeing the Necker in one way or another, or switching back and forth, is a 
visual phenomenon. A change in aspect is a change in visual awareness. So that one can 
perfectly well be aware (see) that the lines of the Necker are an image of a cube in orientation 
A while seeing the Necker as an image of a cube in orientation B. (Pro tem I will speak of 
seeing as here.) Once again, ‘see that’ is not a perceptual use of ‘see’. Back, then, to the drawing 
board.
!e Necker, the duck-rabbit, the black and white cross, the concave-convex step, the 
puzzle picture (a rabbit, say, hidden in grass, or the yacht in the mass of dots), and so on, all 
present us with one sort of case Wittgenstein discusses, here a sort which naturally $ts the 
rubric ‘seeing-as’. It is but one sort of case. On its own I do not think it is very revealing of 
Wittgenstein’s overall purpose. So far, though, I think we have a sort of case which can be 
treated, naturally enough, as a case of perception; thus as a case to which intentionality is not 
really relevant. !e thing to remember is that the rabbit, the duck, the tiger or the yacht 
di%cult to pick out among the mass of dots, are, $rst of all, images in pictures, and, second, 
things which are there to be seen. !e picture is an image of a yacht, di%cult as it may be to 
make this out. When one sees the image of the cube in orientation A, one sees an image that 
is there to be seen. !e peculiar thing about ‘ambiguous’ pictures, like the Necker, the black 
cross-white cross, the convex-concave step, is that it is not possible to see all that is there to be 
seen at once. If I see the cube in orientation A, that is at the price of missing the cube in 
orientation B. I may know that it is there—that the lines are organised in that way too. But I 
cannot then see it.
What lesson do we learn so far? One might think of things like this. In normal 
perception one sees what is before his eyes. Or at least that is a sort of outer limit. One does 
not see of this what is not visible—what is obscured by something else, or in the dark, or too 
small, or faint, or large, for his perceptual capacities. !ere is also another way to fail to see 
what is before one’s eyes—or at least to fail, on some occasions, to count as seeing it. One may 
miss it, or be oblivious to it. Such contrasts give special reasons, sometimes operative, to deny 
that someone saw something. What is missing, where these are reasons, is suitable uptake on 
the seer’s part; some suitable form of registering what one sees (suitability liable to vary with 
the occasion for asking for it).
Occasion-insensitively, there is no very determinate general demand on uptake. It 
might take di#erent forms on di#erent occasions, or for di#erent purposes. For all of which 
there may remain some such demand. What uptake then might be is some responding 
attitude—a form of thought. E.g., one recognises what he sees as such-and-such, or at least 
takes it to be such-and-such. ‘Did you see my aunt’s pen on the table?’, ‘Yes, I did.’ Here, then, 
is a possible role for thought to play even in the most banal cases of perceptual experience: the 
awareness one enjoys is perceptual awareness (insofar as it is seeing that is in question); but 
one does not count as enjoying it at all unless he responds to this awareness with a thought of 
some kind. I do not assert that this is generally so. It is just one way things might go in an 
experience of seeing. Now, a possible view of things like the Necker, or the duck-rabbit, is that 
in this kind of case thought must play such a role. What is there to be seen spoils us for, at the 
same time unavoidable, choice. In the case of your aunt’s pen, visual awareness was anyway 
a#orded, even if, for one reason or another, we want to insist that the o#er was not taken up. 
In the case of the Necker, we cannot so much as say that visual awareness was a!orded 
independent of the viewer’s responses to what was before him. For one sees the A-cube only 
in remaining oblivious to the B-cube, and vice-versa. Here nothing but a response can sort 
out what was seen from what was not. Perhaps, then, there is just no space between seeing the 
A-cube and recognising this as what one sees. To say this is not to assert any general thesis. 
Here I merely note a possibility.
As noted, the Necker, duck-rabbit, etc., carry no hint of any intentionality in perception. 
So far we are dealing entirely with seeing things there to be seen—by one. True, one might see 
one such thing while missing another—necessarily so in cases like the Necker. But here the 
question is just one of recognising oneself to be seeing what he does. Nor is there anything 
here one sees under one description but not another. One sees the Necker anyway; and what 
one sees of what there is to be seen (e.g., a cube in orientation A) is what one sees no matter 
how described. If the A-cube was Napoleon’s favourite, then to see it is to see Napoleon’s 
favourite. Here, though, there is at least the germ of an idea that—in certain cases, not as a 
general rule—one sees only what he can credit himself with having seen.
Such is one sort of case. !e interest of that germ of a suggestion emerges only when we 
come to other sorts. Here again Frege comes on the scene. Frege argued that there is no such 
thing as a thought (a way to make truth turn on how things are) which is about what he called 
a ‘Vorstellung’. Here for a thought to be about a Vorstellung is for its truth to turn irreducibly 
on how that Vorstellung is (or on whether it is). So it is not settled whether the thought is true 
until it is settled what the Vorstellung is (was) like in relevant respects. By a Vorstellung Frege 
means, as he explains, something which ‘requires a bearer’ (that is, which is an object of some 
particular thinker’s consciousness), and which brooks no two bearers: if I were aware of a 
Vorstellung and you were, there would be at least two Vorstellungen. If Frege’s point holds 
good (and Wittgenstein certainly seemed to think so), then the problem for philosophy of 
mind is to see how to think of psychological phenomena without assigning Vorstellungen any 
essential role in them. Where the phenomena are, or appear to be, perceptual, one way for 
them to work would be for thought (responses to what is happening to you) to take over some 
of the roles which, in the case of perception are played by, e.g., what is before your eyes. If I 
saw a bísaro, that is because that is what was there. If I ‘saw stars’, perhaps, that is because such 
is my response to what happened to me. I think McGinn takes this idea very seriously. (!is is 
not a criticism.)
In the late manuscripts, one of the main ways in which Wittgenstein develops this idea 
of responses taking over functions which belong, in perception, to what those responses are 
to is in opposing an idea of what he calls an ‘inner image’. !at idea, applied to the Necker, 
would look like this. Suppose I see the A-cube, then there is an ‘aspect shi'’—an experience 
of things changing for me visually—and then I see the B-cube. Something has changed. But 
this is not the drawing before me. What changed? Certainly what I was visually aware of: $rst 
I was aware of one cube-image, then another (both o#ered to me by the drawing before me, 
though through o#ers which cannot be taken up simultaneously). Problem: I was also aware 
of the shi". So, one might think, I was aware of something which shi'ed. First it was one 
thing—an image of the A-cube—then another—an image of the B-cube. !at something 
could not be the drawing before my eyes. It is at this point that one posits an ‘inner image’—
something very much like an image of a cube, but a Vorstellung in Frege’s sense. Wittgenstein 
works hard to show that this idea collapses if pushed a bit. He writes,
If I know that the schematic cube has various aspects and I want to $nd 
out what someone else sees, I can get him to make a model of what he 
sees, in addition to a copy, or to point to such a model, even though he 
has no idea of my purpose in demanding two accounts.
But when we have a changing aspect the case is altered. Now the 
only possible expression of our experience is what before perhaps 
seemed, or even was, a useless speci$cation when once we had the copy.
And this by itself wrecks the comparison of ‘organisation’ with 
colour and shape in visual impressions. (1953/2001: 168)
!e lines in the Necker (this particular one) are coloured as they are, as is their background. 
Each is the length it is, in the orientation relative to the background and to the other lines that 
it is, and so on. So much for colour and shape. Suppose the Necker were an unambiguous 
picture of, say, a house or a staircase. !en that those shapes and colours depicted that would 
be a matter of what Wittgenstein calls the ‘organisation’ of the picture. Again, if those lines 
form a rabbit (say, not in a rabbit-duck, but just in a drawing of a rabbit), that would be a fact 
of organisation.
What changes when, in viewing the Necker, we experience a shi' from box A to box B? 
!ere is a change in how the Necker looks. Perhaps, then, there is a change in something 
viewed, or at least in some object of visual awareness (something experienced visually). 
Perhaps it is a change in the organisation of something we are visually aware of. Suppose this 
a change in an inner image (or, perhaps, exchange of inner images). But, to repeat, the change 
is in how things look. If we think of the inner image as an object of visual awareness, what 
changes in what it o#ers for awareness of when, in viewing the Necker, one experiences a 
shi'? It remains an image of the same arrangement of lines, shapes, colours—the Necker’s. 
Nothing changes in those respects. It remains an image of the Necker, itself an ambiguous 
image. It remains an image of such ambiguity.
In general, an image need not be just an arrangement of shapes and colours. It may also 
depict—be, e.g., an image of Napoleon. So, too, perhaps, for an inner image. At one moment 
it depicts the A-box, at another, it, or a replacement, depicts the B. But for an image to depict 
something is not for there to be some extra element in how it looks. An image of Napoleon 
may have a visually identical twin which is an image of something else, or nothing at all (or 
just a human being). So, too, for the inner image. If we could make sense of it suddenly 
changing in re what it depicted—if we could make sense of it being in the depicting business 
at all—such a change would not be one in how it looked. !e inner image o#ers no better 
candidate for what a shi' in looks consists in than the Necker does itself. It makes no 
progress.
My image of, say, All Souls need not be—is not likely to be—something one might 
draw. What drawing could capture the oppressive (or, perhaps, exhilarating) aura I imagine to 
be there? When it comes to ‘inner’ images, Wittgenstein is alive to such possibilities. An inner 
image of the Necker, so conceived, might well change as aspect shi's. What thus changes lies 
in my response, or responsiveness, to what is seen; if we model this on the All Soul’s case, a 
change belonging to the realm of thought. I would now have a new impression of what the 
lines were an image of. On my understanding of the Necker (perhaps not Wittgenstein’s) what 
changes in a shi' is what is seen, ‘see’ here a straightforward perceptual verb, its object thus 
something there for one to see. For what I see to change here would then be for there to be a 
change in uptake—in what, there anyway to be seen impressed me, was registered—under 
those special conditions the Necker poses, in which taking in one thing precludes taking in 
another.
If this view of the Necker is correct, then I may say, ‘I see the A-cube’, if that is what I 
am doing, using ‘see’ as a straightforward perceptual verb. I might also go on to say: ‘I see it as 
an A-cube.’ What would the ‘as’ add (if anything)? Or, less tendentiously, what would the 
di#erence be? Perhaps it is possible to hear the ‘as’ as adding nothing; as simply a way of 
saying how it looks: it looks to me as an (image of) an A-cube would. But I think the ‘as’ can 
also work to make the whole verb not purely perceptual, but rather one which works to report 
how I think of what I am seeing. Consider a di#erent case: a puzzle painting. I stare at it for 
hours and see only a mass of dots. Finally, the yacht comes into focus for me. ‘I see the yacht!’, 
I might exclaim, excitedly. Suppose now that I go on to say: ‘I see it (the painting) as a 
painting of a yacht.’ Such would be taking an extra step. !ere is the yacht to be seen, alright. 
But now I also hold a certain view of the matter: if you want to depict a yacht, this is a way of 
doing that too. Here we have another example of the genre yacht-portrayal. !us, if what was 
hidden in the dots had been a pig, the painting might deserve a place alongside the 
Morelands. (!is is not just a psychological experiment being in"icted on you.)
Similarly with the Necker. I may see it as an image of an A-cube. !is may be for me to 
see it as (also) an image of an A-cube. (Before, say, I saw only the B-cube, or only a mass of 
lines.) I see how it can be that too. I see it to be (inter alia) that. Or I see it as (none other 
than) an image of an A-cube. What it is, to my mind, is just a sort of diagram of an A-cube. 
(If someone said he saw a B-cube, I might, e.g., count him as su#ering a sort of illusion, or 
anyway, as not seeing the thing for what it really was.) All the above are activities of thought. 
!is is not to say that the simple ‘I see the A-cube’ reports something entirely independent of 
thought. But if there are such uses of ‘see as’, which say something not said just in that simple 
‘see’, that is a signal to take care when it comes to saying just what role thought does play in 
what is reported in the simple ‘I see the A-cube’.
Two (related) things are distinctive about the Necker (and the duck-rabbit, the black/
white cross, etc.). First, while it provides us two di#erent things to see, it does this while 
occupying a given location, and providing us the same thing at that location to be seen (or 
missed) no matter which of the two options we take up. At that location is a pattern of lines. It 
remains the same where we see the A-cube and where we see the B-cube. And (unless we 
miss it, hence see neither cube) that occupant of the location is something we do see 
throughout. Second, in this case, seeing the one thing (the A-cube, say) excludes seeing the 
other. !e exclusion lies in the seeing: what is there to be seen leaves either option open. So 
the question is how seeing can impose a choice between these two. Here, clearly, uptake is all. 
Our responses to what we are presented with visually must choose what kind of visual 
experience we have, or what it is of. Without varying what we are presented with, our 
responses, or uptake, might make what we see either of two things. As I read Wittgenstein, he 
is developing reasons for caution in how we appeal to responses here, or in just what in 
responses might do that selecting which, patently, is done. Where ‘see as’, read non-
perceptually, adds something to what would be said here in the simple ‘see’, prima facie, at 
least, that something is not something appeal to which would do the needed selecting. So, for 
example, I may see how it could be a diagram of an A-cube, or see it to be, or see it as one (as 
Sid may see Vic as a rival). But that sort of uptake, if it belongs to what is added in seeing as—
an addition purely in thought, on a par with recognising what I see as the cube on the exam 
yesterday—cannot be what distinguishes seeing an A-cube from seeing a B-cube in looking at 
a Necker. If uptake does the choosing, then I see the A-cube just where I am responsive in a 
given way to what I see. For me, things are, visually, just as they would be in seeing the A-
cube. Such is an attitude on my part. But it is not the same as seeing that such-and-such, nor 
seeing the Necker as such-and-such, where ‘see-as’ does not speak of perceptual awareness.
It is thus, I think, that the Necker and its kin serve as a stepping stone to a range of 
further cases. Of some of these, at least, Wittgenstein makes the following remark:
Here one must guard against thinking in traditional psychological 
categories—say, decomposing experience into seeing and thought; or 
things of that sort. (1982: §542)
!is ‘here’ refers to a particular kind of case (or several). It is not as though, for Wittgenstein, 
Frege was wrong to distinguish between seeing and thinking as he did. An ordinary case of 
seeing is just that, seeing. It is not thinking. Its objects are fundamentally di#erent: in one 
case, a pig chewing turnips (an episode taking place at a particular location in history); in the 
other that the pig is chewing turnips, something without location, either temporal or spatial 
(though what it represents as some given way is the way things are at a time, and, perhaps, a 
place). But there are special cases of the use of ‘see’ such that something speaks in favour of 
regarding them as perceptual uses, something in favour of regarding them as not perceptual; 
and in such cases, Wittgenstein suggests, the urge to choose should sometimes be resisted.
To what sorts of cases is this advice meant to apply? Drawing from its surroundings, 
cases, it seems, like these: seeing a similarity between two faces (where someone might see the 
faces as well as you, but not see the similarity); seeing a row of evenly spaced dots as 
organised into pairs; seeing someone you have not seen for years and not recognising him, 
then recognising him. I think one might also include here things like seeing swastikas, or 
crosses, in a mullioned window, or seeing shapes in clouds (e.g., seeing how that cloud is pig-
shaped).
!e $rst thing to note about these cases is: insofar as there is talk of seeing here (‘see’ 
used as a perceptual verb), there is no question of seeing anything other than what is there to 
be seen. If you have not yet learned to see swastikas in a mullioned window, I can show you 
how. !ey are there to be seen. A row of evenly spaced dots is, eo ipso, a row of pairs of dots. 
If you see the pairs, you again see something there to be seen. !ough there may be such a 
thing as ‘seeing’ (seeming to see, or believing you see) a pig shape in a cloud when there is 
none to be seen, nothing like that need be supposed to get the sort of case wanted here. 
Indeed, the supposition would only distort. If you see a resemblance between a man’s face and 
his father’s, you see, so far, something there to be seen. You would be disappointed to learn 
this was not so. So far we can understand this as seeing (the presence of) a certain kind of 
look; a look for a face to have, one liable to run in families. It may be di%cult to draw the 
look. (Perhaps it is even undrawable.) But $nding the abstract features of facial contour which 
de$ne this look is the sort of thing psychologists actually undertake, o'en enough 
successfully. (Wittgenstein suggests that to learn to see the resemblance, or that look for a face 
to have, you need to go beyond what is visually presented when you look at that face we now 
both see. You need to see the father too, or to see a series of faces with that look, or etc. I 
think I depart from Wittgenstein here in thinking this (if so) at all important. !e fact 
remains, on his story or mine, that what you learn is to recognise (pleonastically) something 
there to be recognised.)
!e second thing to observe here is that in each of these cases there is a question one 
might puzzle over as to whether the di#erence between seeing and not seeing the thing in 
question is a di#erence in visual experience—that is, whether one visually experiences 
something in the case where he sees other than what he experiences where he does not? Does 
it look di#erent where you perceive the dots as a string of pairs? Does it look di#erent where 
you recognise (see) the swastika in the mullioning? Does the face look di#erent when you see 
the resemblance, or when you recognise it as your old friend’s face? In each case there is a 
temptation both to say ‘Yes’ and to say ‘No’, or at least ‘It need not’. Unless you are su#ering an 
illusion, the dots should be drawn the same way in drawing what you see whether or not for 
you it is a string of pairs of dots. Similarly for the other cases. !ere need not be anything new 
to draw when you see the resemblance. !ere has been uptake to, recognition of, a look there 
anyway. You need not draw the mullions in any new way unless seeing the swastikas causes 
you, in addition, to su#er some optical illusion. And so on. On the other hand, there is in 
each case a temptation to say, ‘Now it looks di#erent’—when you see the swastikas, that is, or 
the pairs, or that look shared by father and son, or recognise your  friend. If you were 
directing a movie, and you came to the scene where our slightly paranoid protagonist is 
suddenly struck by swastikas in the mullions, you might well make the windows look 
di#erent for an instant or two—thus giving the audience hints of what is going on.
I suggest that it is here that Wittgenstein suggests that we should not think in those 
‘familiar psychological categories’. How then? I will stop short of answering that question 
here. But I extract this leading idea from Wittgenstein’s texts. Half of it is this:
What is the criterion of the visual experience? !e criterion? What do 
you suppose?
!e representation of ‘what is seen’. (1982: §563; PI II, xi, p. 
169)
!e other half is this:
!e concept of a representation of what is seen, of a copy, is very elastic, 
and so together with it is the concept of what is seen. But the two are 
intimately connected. (Which is not to say that they are alike.) (1982: 
§446; PI II, xi, p. 169)
What is a representation of what is seen? Something which represents what was seen as being 
such-and-such. What I think Wittgenstein has in mind here is something which shows what 
was seen to be such-and-such. Like an image (say, my image of All Souls), it may be (in whole 
or part) something visual, but it may also not be this. !ere is nothing it looks like for All 
Souls to have that particularly stu#y atmosphere I picture it as having; though, again, 
cinematically you might try to show it, for example, in that peculiarly a#ectless way in which 
the fellows greet each other. If I see the line of dots as a line of pairs, to show this in a $lm you 
might make them actually so group themselves before the audience’s eyes. Which need not 
mean that that is what they do for me (as if in so seeing them I su#er an illusion). (Does the 
director thus represent what I see? Here we come to the point that the notion of 
representation is elastic. (And with it, Wittgenstein notes, that of what is seen—let this be read 
perceptually.)
Now one needs to understand the method of representing in a way in which no 
understanding seemed called for when it was a question of mere reproduction. Suppose the 
pairs separate themselves from each other, so that there is actually more space between them 
than between their members. !is is a way of showing how things looked. But it is also a way 
of showing how things looked where the looker su#ered a certain sort of illusion—an illusion 
of some distances being larger than they are. One needs to be sensitive to which it is; needs to 
know how to take the longer distances in the representation. !ey show the right thing under 
what (I think) Wittgenstein calls one ‘method of projection’, not under another. (Here the idea 
that the notion of a representation is elastic.)
Seeing the line of dots as a line of pairs of dots is an example of what Wittgenstein calls 
‘seeing an organisation in’ what is seen. Suppose I see the line as a line of pairs of dots. I see it 
organised in a certain way. Now, Wittgenstein tells us, one can show the colour of what was 
seen, and the shapes of what was seen, just by producing that colour and those shapes. But to 
show an organisation that was seen one needs to take a di#erent step. One step would be, not 
to show, but to describe: ‘He saw the line as a line of pairs of dots’. Another would be to show 
it, to draw something. But then what one needed to draw would not be determined by what 
was there before the eyes. It would all depend on how one’s drawing was to be taken. What we 
need here is some ‘method of projection’. And practically anything might show the right thing 
under some such method. !e interesting thing is that, for all this, what is being described 
might still be someone seeing such-and-such, undergoing a particular kind of perceptual 
experience.
Suppose I stare at the kitchen counter, where my keys are in plain sight. But I simply fail 
to see the keys. Suppose you want to draw what I see. Two ways of doing so. First, you draw 
the kitchen counter, but in the region of the keys, you leave a hole in your drawing: there is 
nothing to be said as to what was seen there, only something to be said as to what was not: the 
keys. Another method would be to draw an empty kitchen counter. But this could be crediting 
me with ‘seeing’ something I did not: an empty expanse of counter. Which need not be how it 
was when I failed to see the keys. Whether what you draw is a correct representation of what I 
saw depends, for one thing, on how your drawing is to be taken; perhaps also on the 
circumstances in which it is o#ered.
So now consider seeing the resemblance in the face—a resemblance, say, between a 
son’s face and his father’s. How would one represent what was seen? Again, that depends on 
the way a given representation would be (or be to be) to be taken. But one would need to take 
account of the fact that, so far as what is reproducible is concerned—things, that is, like 
shapes and colours—there is no reason to suppose that anything di#erent was seen by one 
who did see the resemblance than by one who did not. So we need some form of 
representation of what was seen which needs to be taken in the right way. Wittgenstein’s idea 
for doing this amounts to roughly the following. To see the resemblance is to bring what was 
seen under a given generality (represent it to oneself as so falling). And, as Frege insisted, 
doing that is a function of thought, not sight. Wittgenstein’s rough idea: To see the 
resemblance is to register, or note, seeing what would also be seen in such-and-such range of 
other cases. One is presented visually with what he is. What he sees is $xed not just by his 
registering, or being suitably sensitive to, things being (visibly) as they were, but also by his 
responding to what he sees by bringing it (now in thought) under given generalities. Here it is 
that that ‘thinking in traditional categories’ which Wittgenstein refers to lets us down.
Now we seem to have cases with the following two features. First, they involve questions 
of what was seen—of what needs representing to represent this—where the objects of ‘see’ are 
(speak of) the sorts of things which might be objects of sight: not that such-and-such, but 
rather objects, events or episodes, visible features of those objects, such as, e.g., looking just 
like Elvis, or having an Elvis qui#. So they are cases where ‘see’ seems to function like a verb 
of perception. But, second, they are cases where seeing seems to involve noting, or being 
struck by, something; thus responding in a certain way to what one sees. And this seems to 
involve us with things which belong to thought, and not to perception. !e above idea about 
representing gives us another way of putting the point. In these cases, representing what was 
seen seems to require producing what calls for understanding in the same ways that 
representing truly or falsely does. It requires representing something as something, rather 
than (if this is a contrast) simply producing the colour of something. Here, I suggest, is where 
Wittgenstein wants to abandon ‘traditional psychological categories such as seeing and 
thinking’. !e representing involved here remains in a subject’s responses (in thought) to what 
he is presented with. But the upshot concerns what is seen.
Wittgenstein states, “Noticing is a visual experience” (1982: §511). I take it he does not 
mean to include noticing that; nor, e.g., noticing a radio playing in the street. Rather he is 
speaking here of noticing the sort of thing which can be experienced visually in being 
presented with it visually. In any case, what he says about noticing contrasts with what he says 
about seeing as:
If I saw the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, then I saw: these shapes and colours 
(I give them in detail)—and I saw besides something like this: and here 
I point to a number of di#erent pictures of rabbits.—!is shows the 
di#erence between the concepts.
‘Seeing as …’ is not part of perception. And for that reason it is 
like seeing and again not like seeing. (PI II xi p. 168)
!e last remark does not follow the same passage in LW I (§467). Still, the two concepts 
Wittgenstein is speaking of here do seem to be seeing and seeing-as. I will suppose that he 
does mean to contrast seeing-as with noticing in the way suggested here. What contrast might 
Wittgenstein have in mind?
Suppose I stare at the kitchen counter and simply do not see my keys (which are in 
plain sight). !en I notice them. Now I enjoy visual awareness where formerly I did not—
awareness of something there all along to be aware of. (Here I bracket issues of (Leibnizian) 
unconscious perception.) !e di#erence, of course, lies in uptake. But it need only consist in 
my taking in more history than I did before. I am now prepared to bring the scene under 
generalities I would not have brought it before—being a case, e.g., of my keys being before my 
eyes. But my new awareness is just of what it is that history furnishes to do the instancing. I 
see more of this. Such, I suggest, is the sense in which noticing belongs to perception.
By contrast, suppose that, staring at Pia’s face, I suddenly notice that resemblance to her 
father. !ere is a certain look which they share—which, perhaps, runs in the family. For 
Wittgenstein at least, to notice a look, or a resemblance (in such a case) is to be suitably 
sensitive to its being the look it is; which is to be (su%ciently) prepared to identify it on its 
other occurrences. Which, I have suggested, is to bring the look under a certain generality; 
which (within a Fregean perspective, at least) is an exercise of thought. It is just when we 
allow this that we also need to be prepared to abandon traditional categories. For one can 
enjoy visual awareness of the look. One can, so to speak drink it in, study it, draw it, fantasise 
over it, and so on.
Perhaps unlike Wittgenstein, I think ‘see as’ does have purely visual applications—most 
notably in cases of illusion. For example, under certain lighting (and viewing) conditions, it is 
possible for convex and concave to reverse for one. In my experience, this most notably 
makes houses and other architecture look very strange. E.g., a perfectly ordinary two story 
house suddenly seems to have strange appendages growing out of it. Like any illusion, once it 
happens it can be very di%cult to make it go away. !inking that things are not so is, as a rule, 
of little help. Where such a thing happened to me, I would be prepared to say: ‘I see convex as 
concave, concave as convex.’ Similarly (another sort of illusion) I might see a "y before my 
eyes as some large monstrous thing "ying around in my garden. I would not say: ‘I see a large 
monstrous thing in my garden’. (More on that in the next section.) ‘See as’, though, does seem 
to $t my needs here.
Obviously, though, Wittgenstein is not thinking of such uses of ‘see as’ (whether he 
allows them or not). !e particular case he mentions is seeing the rabbit-duck as a rabbit. 
!is is not to be a matter of seeing the rabbit-likeness. It is not a matter of visual awareness. So 
it is not to be classed with seeing convex as concave; nor with the sort of Necker-like switch 
one experiences when he $nally gets what he knows ought to be a rabbit-duck to look like the 
rabbit, and not the duck. So, presumably, it is something which may occur or not no matter 
which way the picture looks to the viewer at the moment. Someone might say, for example, 
‘!e funny thing about this rabbit picture is that, sometimes, if you screw your eyes up right, 
it looks just like a duck-picture.’ Someone who said that would be one who took the picture 
for, classi$ed it as, a rabbit picture. !is, of course, is a way of thinking of it, and not a form of 
visual awareness.
3. Anscombe: !e above is but the barest, and most tentative, outline of an attempt to 
understand, or pro$t from, those late manuscripts in the form of notes by Wittgenstein to 
himself. One might see them as Wittgenstein’s attempt to think through Frege’s attempt to 
distinguish two sorts of things to be aware of, and, correspondingly, two forms of awareness: 
things of the sort to fall under generalities of the sort which concern him, and those 
generalities themselves; among which things of the sort which might be before the eyes, and 
things not of that sort. Much of the above may be debatable. But the one thing I need for my 
immediate purpose is this: there is no sign in Wittgenstein’s discussions of seeing, or of seeing 
as (or of aspects) that he thinks there is any such thing as a use of ‘see’ which is both for 
speaking of perceptual experience and intentional. ‘See that …’ may sometimes fail to survive 
substitution of co-referring singular terms. And ‘See … as …’, used to speak of an activity of 
thought may sometimes take an object which speaks of what is not so (e.g, Sid see Vic as a 
threat while he is not). But such things, if so, do not bear on the question whether there is 
anything intentional about perception (or, to use Anscombe’s term, sensation). So, I suggest, 
when we delve into Wittgenstein on perception and its relation to thought, we do not $nd 
him lining up with Anscombe on such matters; nor against either Austin or me. Such was the 
$rst point I aimed to make.
!ere remains the question whether Anscombe is right. If she is maintaining that ‘see’, 
used to mean what it does mean (or at least one such thing if there are several) may be 
understood to speak of a certain perceptual feat one might perform (or fate one might su#er), 
and that this is intentional in the sense that, on this understanding, one may see things not 
there for one to see, or see something there to see, but under one description and not another, 
then I will suggest, at the very least no case has been made. But to see this, we need to look at 
some of her examples. I will discuss only the $rst four on her list (1965/1981: 120). !is will 
do, I think, to suggest how to go on in the same way.
Her $rst example is this: “When you screw up your eyes looking at a light, you see rays 
shooting out from it.” (Quotes hers. I omit doubling.) Here the simplest thing to say is: a 
familiar phenomenon; with an idiom to match. Speaking for myself, I am inclined to hear 
scare-quotes around the ‘see’. But—like ‘seeing stars’ when you stand up fast with low blood 
sugar—the case is so familiar that those scare quotes can certainly be close to inaudible. (!us 
my mention of idioms.)
If more than idiom is at work here, one might ask this: on that supposed understanding 
of ‘see’, whatever it may be, when would it be true that you saw X? Two answers are possible. 
One is: screw up your eyes and look at the light. If it now looks (to you) just as if, or as it 
might if, there were rays shooting out of the light, then, on this understanding of ‘see’, you saw 
rays shooting out of the light. If that is all there is to it, we can go beyond seeing rays. I might 
say, ‘If you screw up your eyes and look at the light, you will see "ying monkeys/knives and 
forks shooting out of the light.’ Depending on just what sort of mushroom we have been 
eating, and other factors, this might turn out to be true (on our present idea of what is said in 
saying, ‘I see …’, on this understanding). I, at least, am unpersuaded that there are any such 
truths. Of course, someone who su#ers hallucinations (a schizophrenic, say) may be said to 
‘see’ things that are not there. But here, I think, scare-quotes are important. You may ‘see’ 
ghosts, or lions in the kitchen, when there are none. !e problem then is that you are ‘seeing’ 
things which are not there to be seen; that is, not seeing anything.
A second answer: seeing rays shooting out of a light is a special case—or at least 
di#erent from seeing "ying monkeys shooting out—because it is the sort of thing one might 
experience. So if we counted it as something someone might see, that would be because, even 
though there are literally no rays coming out of the light (or anyway, no such rays), !at 
description made recognisable what it was being used to indicate, which is, in fact, something 
there for one to see. !ere is a familiar, quite public, phenomenon at issue here. When you 
look at a light source—the sun, especially low on the horizon, headlights at night, a bare bulb 
in the ceiling of the only hotel room you could $nd—there is a way it o'en looks for it to be 
emitting light. (You may have to screw up your eyes to see this in the bulb’s case, depending, 
e.g., on the density of "yspecks. Typically you need do no such thing in the case of 
headlights.) !e light emanating from the source makes it look as though it were coming out 
in rays, or anyway what we colloquially call rays. (‘!e last rays of sunlight disappeared from 
the surface of the water.’) Watching the sun set, you thus witness a familiar visual 
phenomenon, which we o'en describe—invoking poetic licence no doubt—as rays 
emanating, or, sometimes, shooting, out. (Compare: ‘!e lake sparkled in the sunlight.’ No 
mention of seeing here. A point to which I shall return.)
Anscombe’s second example is this: (again in quotes) “I see the print very blurred: is it 
blurred, or is it my eyes?” Again, I do not speak as Anscombe apparently does. Philosophy 
should not be decided by that sort of thing. I record, anyway, what I would say: ‘I see the print 
blurrily. Is it blurred? Am I seeing blurred print? Or is it just my eyes?’ If it is just my eyes, 
then I do not think I see anything blurred (here ‘blurred’ an adjective modifying what I see), 
but, perhaps, ‘blurred’ can function as an adverb, for want of a better (‘blurrily’ being an ugly 
word). It is perhaps worth noting that in the kind of case Anscombe has in mind, it need be 
neither the print nor my eyes. I can be looking at the (perfectly clear) print through some sort 
of distorting medium—a lens, perhaps, or some sort of screen. In that case, I see the print 
looking blurred, for such is how it looks under such conditions. I do not see blurred print on 
any understanding of ‘see’ I can muster, since there is no blurred print to be seen. I note that 
Anscombe does not suggest as her example, ‘I see blurred print. Is it the print or my eyes?’ 
Whereas, if we understand her ‘blurred’ as an adjective modifying ‘print’, there should be no 
di%culty in so speaking (if she is right)—so not that di%culty to which she thus exhibits 
sensitivity. So, again, no evidence here for an understanding of ‘see’ on which one can see 
things that are not there. Nor any other evidence here of any ‘intentionality’ in seeing.
Anscombe’s third example is: “Move these handles until you see the bird in the 
nest.” (Squint-testing apparatus; the bird and the nest are on separate cards.) You look, and 
when it appears as it would were the image of a bird in the image of a nest, you say, ‘Now!’. Let 
us suppose that this reveals the intentionality of seeing (on some (extant) (perceptual) 
understanding of ‘see’). Now let me demonstrate to you the intentionality of the verb ‘to 
canoe’. I buy my niece a video game. !e object of the game is, through judicious choice of 
means and ends, to arrive at the lost temple of the Alcaponahuatls, that ancient civilisation at 
which we all wonder. She turns towards her game-player, I leave the room. A'er a co#ee and 
a sonho, I return to the television room and ask, ‘Well, what are you doing now?’ She replies, 
‘I’m canoeing down the Amazon.’ ‘Well’, I tell her, ‘I think you have a problem, since the lost 
temple is in Peru.’ In case you missed this part of the story, my niece is sitting in front of her 
(parents’) television. It is a hemisphere and a bit away from the Amazon. And the family has 
no canoe. Now that you have seen the trick, I think you can see how I could also show that 
‘walk’, ‘eat’, ‘kick’ are also all intentional. One might say: there is a use of language here, 
parasitic on its normal use, on which we can tell truths where the words, taken literally, 
describe what is not so. Such suggests nothing as to what is, what not, an intentional 
phenomenon.
Anscombe’s fourth example is, “I see six buttons on that man’s coat, I merely see a lot of 
snow "akes framed by this window-frame—no de$nite number.” I take it that Anscombe is 
supposing that the man actually has six buttons on his coat. For the rest, I think that here we 
need to invoke an idea of !ompson Clarke’s (see Clarke, 1965), which he expresses as the 
idea that seeing is a ‘unit’ concept. What he means is that ‘see’ bears various understandings, 
varying from occasion to occasion for its use; and that, in particular, what one sees depends 
on what seeing such-and-such is to be contrasted with—on what not seeing might come to. 
So, e.g., snow"akes are falling. As is their wont, they are falling before your eyes, but also well 
beyond your $eld of view. On an occasion the question may be whether you see the 
snow"akes falling—the snowfall. You do or you do not. No question here of seeing, or not, 
this or that snow"ake. If I identi$ed a snow"ake outside your $eld of view—in the 
neighbour’s backyard, say—well, perhaps it is determinate enough that you did not see that. It 
may, of course, be indeterminate exactly where your $eld of view stops. Perhaps, now, we can 
pick out a given snow"ake; say, one falling before your eyes. !en there are questions one 
might ask, on some occasion or other, as to whether you saw that one. !e answer to each 
such question depends on what, on that understanding of seeing the snow"ake, it might be 
not to see it. Is the point that, as it fell, your back might have been turned? Or that you might 
have blinked? Or is the point that, on that way of counting as seeing a snow"ake or not, you 
should be able, if you saw it, to distinguish it somehow from other snow"akes—that it should 
be, so to speak, a memorable snow"ake? Depending on what is being asked, the question may 
have an answer, or it may be le' indeterminate whether you saw that snow"ake or not.
Anyway, you saw the snow"akes falling; and we can suppose, for sake of argument, that 
there is some de$nite number of them which fell before your eyes (while you watched). On 
one understanding of seeing a snow"ake fall, what you saw was them fall. If n of them fell, 
then you saw n of them fall. !at is one understanding of seeing a snow"ake. !ere are, to be 
sure, others. If the question is how many you saw on some such other understanding, it is one 
we cannot yet approach until it is $xed what that understanding is. Even then we may have a 
question with no determinate answer. It is not $xed in advance, just by the concept see a 
snow#ake, just what kind or quality of uptake is required for seeing a given one. Better: 
independent of an occasion for discussing such things, there is no particular sort of uptake 
that is required. Uptake is required for seeing. But, where seeing is a visual phenomenon, pick 
some object of sight. !e question is then what sort of sensitivity is needed to its presence for 
one to count as seeing it. !ere is no suggestion here that seeing might be intentional, if 
intentionality has anything to do with the possibility of seeing something under one 
description of it while not seeing this under another. Something like that might hold for ‘see 
that’. But the question was whether perception (or sensation) might be an intentional 
phenomenon.
Clarke’s question was how much of the tomato you see. !at is, Clarke’s project was to 
investigate the pitfalls of the question. It is a form of question some of whose instances 
sometimes make sense (and accordingly have a de$nite answer); but whose making sense is 
not automatic. Where the question does have a sense—e.g., how much of the tomato was 
obscured by the wrapping, or the tray, it came in—it may also have a de$nite answer. But it 
does not have one, or no other one, in every case where one sees the tomato. Similarly, I 
suggest, with snow"akes. !e question ‘How many?’ may have a sense, but does not always. 
!ere is not always a question, or a way, of distinguishing between the ones you did see and 
the ones you did not where you watch the snowfall. !e idea of such a distinction does not 
automatically make sense. No such considerations supply anything which did not exist, or 
happen, but is yet something one might see, nor any case of seeing something under one 
description, but not under another. Seeing snow fall is not a case of seeing certain "akes fall 
under one description but not another.
4. Conclusion: McGinn thinks that there is no harm in admitting that seeing is intentional 
on at least some, perhaps secondary or unusual, understandings of the verb. One of her 
questions is why I should need, or want, to resist the idea; or what harm there could be in 
admitting it. !e $rst thought that might occur is that this has something to do with being a 
disjunctivist. I think that, ultimately, it does. But to my mind something still more 
fundamental is at stake. It is a distinction Frege points to between (in my terms) the historical 
and the conceptual. !e conceptual, here, is the realm of generalities: things of which there 
can be cases; things which things may be represented as being. A generality is, for example, 
for things to be such that snow is now falling on Dakar. One may represent the way things are 
as such that snow is now falling on Dakar. Where, as in the example, truth is at stake, what is 
represented as the way in question is things being as they are. It is the way things now are 
which is a case of things being such that snow is falling on Dakar if it is true that snow is now 
falling on Dakar. Of course, representing things as some way there is for things to be may also 
be representing, say, Pia as some way there is for her to be, e.g., as skint, or as sipping arinto 
on esplanada.
!e conceptual, as Frege insists, is not an object of sensory awareness. For things to be 
such that Pia is on a chaise longue sipping arinto is neither on, nor under, the chaise longue, 
nor anywhere else. It cannot be before the eyes. Nor is there anything it looks like. It thus 
cannot be something one might see. Idem that Sid drinks lager. By contrast, some of the 
historical—some of what instances, is a case of, those ways for things to be which things can 
be represented as being—is a (potential) object of sensory awareness. One cannot watch that 
Sid is drinking lager. But one can watch him doing it. To think about the world at all, one 
must be able to recognise cases of one or another generality as such. If things being as they 
are now is a case of things being such that Pia is now sipping arinto, then its so being is the 
sort of thing a thinker must be able to recognise. For this, one needs acquaintance with things 
being as they are. And, in a case like this one, it is perception which, preeminently, plays the 
role of providing such acquaintance. One sees Pia sipping (sees the label on her bottle, and so 
forth), and thereby is able to recognise the way things are as a case of Pia sipping arinto.
Perception, thus, is a way of providing acquaintance with that which can be 
represented, truly or falsely, as being such-and-such ways. Perceptual awareness, e.g., visual 
awareness, is the sort of awareness one enjoys in being so acquainted. Perception’s business is 
not with the generalities under which things fall, but rather with that which falls under them. 
Perceptual awareness is, accordingly, a way of relating to particular objects, episodes, and 
whatever else makes up world history as it unfolds. What matters is that seeing is awareness of 
what instances generalities, so that we can thereby recognise generalities as instanced. It 
presents us neither with those generalities, nor, a fortiori, with these as instanced. Nor does it 
present us with things which, not existing, instance no generalities at all. Such things are not 
what it is for.
Charles Travis
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